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On 18 July, I wrote that prorogation was a paper tiger – a false threat masking
politicking – but that any effort to prevent it would take time which the Parliament
doesn’t have. On 28 August, Boris Johnson advised the Queen to exercise her
prerogative power to prorogue Parliament. She did so on the same day.
There is little time for any alternative to a no-deal
Brexit
There are eight weeks left until the UK’s (revised) scheduled departure from the
EU. Parliament is to be prorogued for five of those weeks. The UK will leave on
no-deal Brexit terms on 31 October unless Parliament legislates for an alternative
among: revocation, a request for extension, or ratification of the current Withdrawal
Agreement. After the last EU Council Summit before Brexit on 17-18 October, only
the option of revocation will remain until 31 October and this is also the only option
which does not require either the unanimous consent (extension) or a qualified
majority (an agreement) of the European Council. Barring an emergency summit
(which has precedence), it is misleading to argue that it is possible to agree an
alternative arrangement without Parliament or in time for, or even after the final
European Council summit.
Can prorogation be prevented?
On 3 September, Parliament returns from summer recess and will have only days
before it is prorogued until 14 October 2019. Within the week, three cases will be
heard in Belfast, Edinburgh, and London seeking judicial review of Government’s
advice to the Queen, and a finding that such advice was illegal obligating the Queen
to withdraw her order to prorogue.
The petitioners argue that the advice was ‘unlawful, unwarranted and
unconstitutional’. The response of government turns on the separation of powers,
and the argument that prorogation as a prerogative power is not a justiciable matter
to be determined by the courts. Either as the exercise of a sovereign power, or as a
matter of politics, the court is unsuited by nature and constitution to adjudicate, and
that ‘[i]f Parliament had a problem with it, it was for Parliament to sort it out’. But this
argument seems paradoxical: how can Parliament sort it out, if it is suspended?
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Paul Craig has set out arguments of the limitations on the use of prerogative power
to prorogue as a matter of both constitutional principle and law. The precedents he
sets out in Proclamations, De Keyser and Miller all, directly or indirectly, protect the
sovereignty of parliament and not the executive. In a searing passage:
“The sovereignty principle inheres in Parliament and the totality of members thereof
at any one point in time. The very idea that Parliament can be swept aside because
its view does not cohere with the executive is to stand principle on its head. We are
constitutionally impoverished if we regard this as the new constitutional norm.”
To repeat from my last post, prorogation in the current context would be
undemocratic as it would suspend parliamentary debate to ensure with near certainty
an outcome without democratic mandate; and unconstitutional, because it would
make parliamentary power merely contingent on government, and not sovereign
apart from it.
While these precedents will appeal to the courts, the real limitation to the relevant
impact of these cases will be time: any injunction granted (if it is granted) would be
referred to the Supreme Court which would likely have only days to deliver judgment.
However, the legislative efforts in Parliament to either avert a no-deal Brexit or to
prevent prorogation are just, if not more, as time limited.
Is this a constitutional crisis?
In the July post, I said that the litmus test for constitutional crisis is where one
institution (be it Parliament, the courts, the government or even the Crown) does not
recognise the legitimate power of another, causing an ongoing and critical state of
legal uncertainty. Such recognition of mutual authority is an aspect of the separation
of powers which is at the core of a state based on the rule of law. Were government
to ignore a Supreme Court judgment finding the advice to prorogue illegal, or even
refuse to recognise an Act of Parliament directing action to prevent a no-deal Brexit,
this would be a constitutional crisis. This will bring all institutions into conflict – most
immediately the crown, which may be obligated (one way or another) to make an
extremely polarising political choice.
To an external eye, such distinction may appear artificial: either the crown has
a choice to exercise power or doesn’t. But the latest developments have laid
bare some apparent paradoxes at the heart of the British constitution: the crown
has exercised a legal power but was politically limited to do so on the advice of
government. The government argues that this power is a sovereign power and so
beyond the review of the courts, despite it being upon their advice. Precedent for
protection of parliamentary sovereignty is found in and by the courts. Parliament is
sovereign, but parliamentary time is dictated, almost exclusively, by the government.
Beyond these paradoxes, we are witnessing the politicisation of the courts and the
crown, in equal measure to the legalisation of the government and the Parliament as
the courts are called in with a second Miller litigation. There are few who could say
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with any certainty what the next few days will bring, beyond the conviction that they
will reveal the very nature of power at the centre of British constitution.
This post was previously posted on the LSE Brexit blog and is reposted here with
kind permission by the author.
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